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Erwin Schrödinger’s Cat model is a thought experiment from quantum mechanics to visualise “nei-
ther dead, nor alive” types of transitional situations. This essay draws certain parallels between this 
Cat and the Brexit process. A process that has been initiated but, in a strictly legal sense, not yet 
unleashed. It might be offi cially launched one day by the UK government, but without any certainty 
as to whether it would be completed at all. There seems to be no trade policy model, which would 
be optimal for both sides: keeping the UK within the Single European market for goods and capital, 
while introducing constraints on the free fl ow of labour is not a real option. A possible strategy for 
both parties may be procrastination: declaring that Brexit is underway, but maintaining the pre-2016 
conditions of economic co-operation and integration, prolonging the current Cat-like situation.
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Brexit seems to be a term with a clear-cut content, but it is probably not. The 
United Kingdom’s secession from the European Union was only initiated (or, in a 
strictly legal sense, recommended), but by no means launched by the British elec-
torate on June 23, 2016. What is the current state of the process? Is it underway, is 
it perhaps accomplished (“the post-Brexit condition of European integration”, or 
“Europe after Brexit”, or even “the Brexit of June 23, 2016”), or is it in a condi-
tion which can by no means be described in terms of the binary (Y/N) logic often 
used in economics?
A curious creature is invited to help outline the problem in a thought experi-
ment. This being was conceived by a Nobel Laureate in Physics (1933), Erwin 
Schrödinger, and is called Schrödinger’s Cat. The model based on the cat was 
constructed in order to shed light on a fundamental problem of quantum mechan-
ics, but it is sometimes used to visualise the co-existence of more parallel states 
of a given system – be it natural, social, or simply imaginary.
“A box is prepared for a cat’s occupancy. Inside this box, there is a small sam-
ple of radium. Also in the box is a detector of radiation, which will detect any 
decays of radium nuclei in the sample. The sample has been chosen so that there 
is a 50–50 probability that within any hour-long period, one decay will occur. 
On the occurrence of such a decay, a circuit will close, tripping a switch that will 
break a beaker filled with a deadly liquid, spilling the liquid onto the floor of the 
box, and killing the cat […].
The cat is now placed in the box, the lid firmly shut, and an hour ticks away. 
At the hour’s end, a human observer approaches the box and opens the lid to see 
what has happened. According to one extreme view of quantum mechanics […], 
only at that moment will the system be forced to ‘jump’ into one of the two pos-
sible eigenstates1 – cat alive and cat dead […]” (Hofstadter 1985: 468).
According to another, more widely accepted view, none or both of this system’s 
two eigenstates exist between when the lid is closed and when it is reopened. 
A third approach tends to suppose the existence of a third state – one which is 
somewhere between the two extreme states, but at an unknown, not measurable, 
and not even definable distance from both. The cat is neither alive, nor dead in 
this special state – if it exists at all.
The European Union’s (and of course the UK’s) Brexit problem (and, poten-
tially, Brexit experiment) may offer an interesting parallel from international eco-
nomics to the Cat model. The lid may have been closed by the plebiscite but, 
seemingly, an unexpected international coalition may appear based on the com-
mon interest in procrastinating its reopening. 
1  The condition of a complex system in which at least one of its fundamental variables/compo-
nents shows stability (author’s remark).
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In the following, we try to identify certain key problems of the Brexit process 
that could not only delay its conclusion, but also lead to some kind of incom-
plete Brexit (“the third state” according to the Cat model). That is, the process 
could potentially be blocked somewhere on the road between EU-28 and EU-27 
(European integration without British membership and participation) and, par la 
force des choses, generate a hitherto unknown kind of partial or incomplete EU 
membership.
Our Cat-oriented essay consists of three parts. First, the political conditions of 
complete or incomplete Brexit are put under brief scrutiny. Second, trade policy 
issues, including the possible frameworks of maintaining free trade across The 
Channel are surveyed. The third part assesses possible strategies.
1. SOME BREXIT POLITICS
The result of the British referendum of June 23, 2016, is not legally binding. 
The exit mechanism specified in Art. 50 of TEU (Article 50 of the Treaty on the 
European Union) was not activated by the referendum (Oulds 2015: 66). No-one 
else than the government of the country wishing to withdraw from the European 
Union has to announce this decision in order to set in motion the process of 
withdrawal for a two-year period. In case no agreement is reached on the terms 
of withdrawal and the new relationship between the seceding country and the EU 
by this deadline, membership is automatically discontinued. The two-year period 
can be extended only with an unanimous decision of the member countries.
The formal exit process might be made lengthy and difficult by the fact that the 
exit should be formalised by an international treaty between the seceding country 
and the European Union. To make matters worse, only the treaty’s ratification by 
each member state can complete the process (Łazowski 2016: 2). Until then, the 
country leaving the EU would be in a Cat-like status: de jure a member, but de 
facto considered a non-member by international investors, multinational firms, 
and officials of foreign governments.
It is a widely shared view that a perhaps decisive fraction of the majority of 
the British electorate voting for Brexit only wanted to send a warning signal to 
Brussels without any serious intent to leave the EU. There is one telling survey 
result on the percentage of the populations of various EU countries favourable to 
the EU. The acceptance of the EU decreased from 54 to 44% in the UK, from 83 
to 72% in Poland, from 80 to 47% in Spain, from 78 to 58% in Italy, from 69 to 
38% in France, from 58 to 50% in Germany between 2004 and 2016, and from 
37 to 27% in Greece between 2012 and 2016 (Stokes 2016: 3). 
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In other words, there has been a growing discontent with the European Un-
ion in a significant part of the member countries, and the UK was not an outlier 
regarding either the change or the size of this popular dissatisfaction. However, 
it has been the only member country which repeatedly expressed its reluctance 
to deeper integration along with its wish to obtain special exemptions in various 
fields where integration is expected to progress. Its opt-outs from the euro project 
or Schengen are just two well-known examples.
Prime Minister Theresa May’s exit strategy seems to be based on her much 
quoted statement, “Brexit is Brexit!” The obvious first meaning of this message 
is the unconditional acceptance of direct democracy: the result of the referendum 
expresses the decision of the electorate, which is therefore politically binding, 
irrespective of its potential lack of legal validity. On the other hand, however, 
she has also made plain her decision not to take the issue to Parliament. This in a 
country that has earned a well-deserved reputation of a very strong concentration 
of legislative power in Parliament. To date, there have been only three referenda 
in the entire UK, with the first (1975) and the third (2016) on the issue of the 
country’s participation in European integration.
Apparently, Brexit would not enjoy a majority support in Parliament. This 
solution may, however, carry a not negligible legal risk: it might undermine the 
British initiative to exit on the domestic side, and open it to cassation. In a legal 
process of this type, the alleged supremacy of direct over parliamentary democ-
racy may not find acceptance in court.
This could yield a surprising result: the British electorate expressed its will to 
exit, the EU is ready to negotiate it, but the British government’s request to Brus-
sels to launch the secession process lacks legal validity. The potential conflict 
between direct and parliamentary democracy remains unresolved, Brexit is on 
the launching pad, but it may remain there indefinitely. A typical Schrödinger’s 
Cat situation.
On the EU side, the political consequences of an accomplished Brexit would 
be far-reaching for at least two reasons. The first and more obvious one is the 
following. Let us assume that Brexit really takes place in the full legal sense and 
the UK can walk away with favourable conditions of post-membership regarding 
trade and flows of capital in the first place. This might create a strong incentive 
for other countries with some predilection for Euroscepticism to initiate Nedxit, 
Cyxit, Grexit, Czexit, or else. It should be recalled that the Brexit idea was put to 
referendum in the UK without any serious reference to the possible conditions of 
the exit process.
The second political implication of Brexit would be linked to a major shift 
in the structure of the European Parliament. This shift would occur in favour 
of the very countries whose ideas on European regulation were rejected by the 
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majority of the British electorate. The Eurosceptical part of the British Conserva-
tive Party was persuaded to support Brexit with the argument that “free trade and 
inter-governmental co-operation” would be the basis of the post-Brexit status of 
the UK in Europe (Liddle 2015: 19).
It has been shown that the so-called liberal bloc (including the UK, the Nordic 
countries, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Slovakia, Ireland, the 
Baltic republics and, in many cases, Germany) would lose its blocking minority 
owing to Brexit (from 41 to 33%, while the threshold for blocking minority is at 
35%) (Irwin 2015: 15). The exit of the UK would not only significantly weaken 
its own camp in European legislation, but would also de facto paralyse it.
A “rule maker” would become a “rule taker” in case the UK wants to maintain 
a close, probably some kind of associate relationship with the EU (Irwin 2015: 
14; McFadden – Tarrant 2015).
European supporters of further deregulation will lose their significant support 
from the UK with Brexit (Kierzenkowski et al. 2016). This is one important para-
dox arising from Brexit: the UK has been one of the driving forces of deregula-
tion in the EU, and its exit will strengthen the pro-regulation side.
It cannot be taken for granted that the EU would envisage a close institutional 
relationship with the UK after Brexit (McFadden – Tarrant, 2015: 61). In any 
event, the EU is very likely not to allow the UK to go for “cherry-picking” when 
negotiating on the level of post-Brexit co-operation in various fields and sectors. 
“Cherry-picking” would mean, in this regard, maintaining a level of co-operation 
close to integration in fields where the UK is interested in this (e.g. trade policy or 
regulation of capital flows), and minimise co-operation in fields where it would 
prefer much weaker links with the EU (e.g. contributions to the EU budget and 
labour market regulation).
There are fields where “cherry-picking” would be a very serious challenge for 
British negotiators due to the double peaked preferences of the UK in certain sec-
tors. One of these fields is agriculture. On the one hand, it belongs to the sectors 
under very strong and centralised EU regulation, which the UK rejects. On the 
other hand, a significant part of the current incomes of British farmers come from 
EU subsidies (60% according to some sources: McFadden – Tarrant 2015: 30) 
which they may lose when Brexit is completed. In case the British treasury would 
compensate them for this loss, part of the net budgetary gain of the UK from 
Brexit would disappear. A further increase of British subsidies for agriculture 
could be generated by the fact that three-quarters of British agricultural exports 
currently go to the EU in an annual value of close to USD 15 billion (Mansfeld 
2015: 12). 
A significant part of these exports would disappear due to the high external 
tariffs of the EU on agricultural goods and food (13.2% on the average: Irwin 
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2015: 22). Low average British farm size is already a factor of competitive disad-
vantage (McFadden – Tarrant, 2015: 30).
The problem of double peaked preferences might make adjustment to Brexit 
very difficult for other key sectors of the British economy, mainly those with 
a strong export orientation towards the EU. Let us take, for example, the car 
industry: the renewal of this industry took place in the 1980s due to Margaret 
Thatcher’s strict industrial policy discontinuing the massive subsidisation of un-
competitive sectors (cf. Edwardes 1985).2 
This renewal was financed to a great extent by non-European multinational 
firms (Toyota, Nissan, and Honda in the first place, and partly also GM and Ford) 
which expanded or just created car assembly lines in the UK in order to multiply 
their export capacities to the EU. Sizeable chunks of these capacities might be-
come uncompetitive after Brexit.
On the other hand, carmakers located in the UK also strongly and frequently 
complained on too restrictive European labour, environmental, and public pro-
curement regulations – the second peak of their preferences.
There is a high probability of a British “cherry-picking” strategy with respect 
to the legal pillars of post-Brexit co-operation. Free flows of manpower and capi-
tal are two of the four crucial “liberties” codified as the guiding principles of 
European integration. The ideologists and propagandists of Brexit had repeat-
edly expressed that they are firmly against the free movement of labour across 
the Channel, above all due to the problem of immigration from within the EU 
that was claimed to increase the unemployment of British subjects (Blockmans 
– Weiss 2016). 
Many of them also insisted that the UK’s future relationship with the EU should 
include free trade of goods, and free movement of capital and financial services 
(Liddle 2015: 19). These are two fields in which the UK is certainly disinterested 
in re-introducing administrative or customs barriers vis-à-vis the EU.
This request was one of the reasons why the term “cherry-picking” was coined. 
It was also due to this request that the Bank of England communicated its not-for-
Brexit stance based on its strong institutional interest in maintaining the freedom 
of flows of capital (Bank of England 2015), which could, of course (Blockmans 
– Weiss 2016), not be granted if separated from other fields of integration.
Some leading Brexiteers presented the referendum as a choice between two 
extreme solutions. One of these would have been “taking back control” of im-
migration policies (but staying in the Single European Market at the same time, 
which is a contradiction close to nonsense), as opposed to the UK’s dissolution 
2  Most traditional British car brands and companies (Austin, Morris, Leyland, Hillman, 
Wolseley, and Riley among others) did not even survive up to the 1990s.
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in a kind of European superstate. This latter option is, however, missing from the 
current portfolio of strategic thinking of the European political mainstream.
The Brexit camp did not pay attention to the subtleties of a string of possi-
ble mixed options. These mixed options could potentially include package deals. 
Certain deals could serve British interests. They could combine, for example, old 
capital and new labour market regulations. 
Further liberal capital market regulations between the EU and the UK would 
be in line with the often expressed interest of the City of London,3 itself a sup-
porter of reforms within the EU (TheCityUK 2015). A certain degree of the de-
regulation of the labour market could ease bureaucratic European employment 
rules. Some of these rules harm competitiveness by raising implicit labour costs,4 
even without restrictive British immigration policies.5 As a compensation, the 
UK could agree on further payments into the EU budget even as a non-member, 
similarly to Norway. 
Such compromises, however, could be treated with some reluctance in Brus-
sels. The reason is that the EU’s negotiating strategy with the UK will likely 
exclude any elements, which could be understood as an incentive for other mem-
ber countries to leave. Just as the UK might be interested in slowing down exit 
negotiations in order to see more clearly which elements of Brexit enjoy domestic 
political support, the EU could propend not to urge the UK in the hope that at 
least some elements of the Brexit process could be reversed.
2. TRADE POLICY: STAYING WITHOUT BEING THERE?
Most Brexiteers did not have a clear vision on the future of EU–UK trade (Emer-
son 2016a: 2), therefore it is to be expected that trade policy issues will not be 
on top of the political agenda when the technical details of Brexit are discussed. 
The trading system between the EU and the UK has, however, yielded much to 
British manufacturing (Booth et al. 2015) owing to trade creation as a result of 
intra-EU free trade.
3  One of the earliest British publications on a possible Brexit dealt with the concerns of the City 
(Springford – Whyte 2014). See also Lannoo 2016.
4  A telling example is the regulations on driving trucks over 3.5 tons. These regulations include 
daily, weekly, and bi-weekly driving limits in hours, and the length of unbroken daily and 
weekly rests along with the prescribed length of rest after 6 or 11 days of driving (Mansfield 
2015: 25).
5  Certain low value-added sectors of the British economy could fear collapse in case of a dis-
appearance of East European workers (cf. McFadden – Tarrant 2015: 29).
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An overall lack of customs duties within the EU could be compared to a WTO 
trading system in which the average weighted mean external level of MFN6 cus-
toms duties is below 3% (and less than 1% for the average weighted mean exter-
nal tariff of the EU) (Booth et al. 2015: 27). These are levels that are close to fully 
liberalised trade if only customs duties are considered as tools of trade policy. 
This would be, however, a too much restricted view. 
The discontinuation of free trade between the EU and the UK could cause 
major disturbances and losses of competitiveness in Europe to a string of British 
industries for two further reasons: 
1.  while the average level of customs duties has certainly been reduced within 
the WTO, so-called tariff peaks exist for some sensitive sectors exporting 
from outside to the EU (e.g. 10% tariffs for cars, and 5% for car parts) (Mc-
Fadden – Tarrant 2015:20); 
2.  the current pattern of international trade liberalisation in the WTO focuses 
on eliminating RTBs.7 These tools of implicit protectionism could easily re-
appear post-Brexit between the EU and the UK, constraining trade between 
them to a significant extent.
Most authors agree that there are four to five options of the post-Brexit regula-
tion of EU–UK trade (Hulsman 2015; Mansfield 2015; Emerson 2016; de Vries 
– Hoffmann 2016; McFadden – Tarrant 2015). Four of these are analogous to 
existing models of trade between the EU and neighbouring partners (Norway, 
Switzerland, Turkey, and the EFTA), and the fifth would be nothing else than a 
non-preferential trading relationship based on MFN tariffs and WTO rules. This 
last option would imply a re-orientation of British trade to the US and the Com-
monwealth countries. It is not too often considered a viable choice, and will be 
discussed here only to a limited extent.
The Norwegian option is the closest to de facto EU membership, and it is 
generally regarded as a low-key version of Brexit. Norway is a member of the 
European Economic Area (EEA) and enjoys full access to the Single European 
Market. It has to adopt EU standards and regulations, but it has a certain influence 
in shaping them, in the first place regarding environmental regulations (Oulds 
2015: 73; McFadden – Tarrant 2015: 7).
6  Most Favoured Nation treatment: single tariff levels to be applied in trade between all WTO 
members, except for preferential customs duties within PTAs or FTAs (Preferential Trade 
Agreement, Free Trade Agreement).
7  Red Tape Barriers – non-tariff barriers to trade such as rules of origin, standards, sanitary, 
phitosanitary, veterinary, environmental, and other regulations, with impacts on imports.
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Norway is a significant contributor to EU spending, although not directly to 
the budget as such, but to various social and cohesion funds. 
British Eurosceptics vehemently oppose this model of post-Brexit co-operation 
because the Norwegian financial contribution to EU programmes is surprisingly 
high: in 2011, its per capita level reached 80% of the per capita contribution of 
the UK to the EU budget (McFadden –Tarrant 2015: 12). A similar result: “if the 
UK’s net budget contribution is calculated on a similar basis to Norway it would 
fall by just 9%. If calculated on a similar basis to Switzerland it would fall by 
55%” (Irwin 2015: 26). 
The opposition of the pro-Brexit camp to this solution is tellingly expressed 
by the dictum “no say, still pay” (Emerson 2016b: 10), although the role of eco-
nomic arguments was relatively limited in the pro-Brexit camp (Łazowski 2016: 
2). The UK would thus give up its influence on EU-level political decisions and 
still remain a significant contributor to its spending, a really bad compromise not 
only from a pro-secession point of view. 
The Swiss option is based on sectoral free trade agreements concluded one 
by one because the country is not a signatory of the EEA in spite of its EFTA 
membership. Switzerland applies EU regulations in those sectors only where free 
trade makes this necessary (Irwin 2015: 6). The primordial objection of the EU 
with respect to this system is the problem of “cherry-picking”, i.e. the potentially 
too strong role of the partner country in specifying the sectors covered by these 
agreements. 
This concern of the EU is expressed by the “guillotine clause”, which treats all 
bilateral EU–Swiss agreements as a single package with the same length of valid-
ity and date of expiry (McFadden – Tarrant 2015: 14). The Swiss side, as opposed 
to the Norwegian case, is not consulted on developing sectoral regulations of 
the EU. These factors make it quite unlikely that either the EU or the UK would 
go for such a regulatory framework of bilateral trade. The EU has stressed that 
its sectoral agreements with Switzerland need an “ambitious and comprehensive 
restructuring” (Emerson 2016b: 13).
The Turkish option is the customs-union based solution (excluding non-
 processed agricultural produce). In case of this choice, the UK would maintain 
the common external tariffs of the EU, avoid contributing to the EU budget, and 
continue to have free access to its internal market in most sectors (not all). It 
would, however, lose all its influence on shaping EU regulations, and its prefer-
ential access to third markets based on the existing FTAs of the EU (Irwin 2015: 
6). In the customs-union based system, the UK would be obliged to apply the 
EU’s preferential external tariffs to third countries, but the reciprocation of this 
would not be automatic and would depend on the UK’s one-by-one negotiations 
with these countries (Emerson 2016b: 10). 
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The Turkish option is often regarded as a quite strong version of Brexit, making 
trade liberalisation the main element of post-Brexit co-operation, but abolishing 
the free movement of agricultural goods, people, capital and services (Mansfeld 
2015: 4). Its “UK-style” extended version covering, for example, financial serv-
ices might be potentially envisaged (Ernst and Young 2016: 5). This extension 
would still generate significant trade-related losses to the UK. Such losses would 
be due to the country’s reduced access to a string of hitherto preferential markets. 
It might also provoke strong resistance in Brussels. The Turkish option seems to 
be a less promising sub-version of the Norwegian option (Emerson 2016: 16). It 
is hardly likely to gain strong political support within the UK.
The FTA (or EFTA) option still leaves many details open. It should be negoti-
ated in-depth, keeping an important trade-off in mind. This trade-off is very likely 
between strong liberalisation in fields where at least one of the parties would be 
interested in it on the one hand, and the level of independence the UK would 
wish to keep in trade policy issues on the other (Irwin 2015:  6). In other words, 
this could be a lighter version of the Norwegian option in which the UK could be 
interested if it had a wide choice of “cherry-picking”.
This option could include a variety of possible scenarios. The number of these 
is probably strongly limited by the EU’s reluctance to set up such a post-exit trade 
policy model, which could serve as a positive precedent case for other potential 
candidates considering leaving the European Union. The feasibility of this option 
is therefore rather questionable. It is certainly not one that could easily emerge 
from a negotiation process shorter than two years.
The survey of the four most often cited trade policy options made it clear that 
none of them would offer a post-Brexit solution on which the two parties could 
swiftly reach an agreement. A fifth possible approach as already noted could be 
avoiding any kind of negotiations on future trade policy co-operation between 
the EU and the UK by simply applying the WTO system based on MFN tar-
iffs to their bilateral relations. The practical feasibility of this model is beyond 
doubt, since lengthy negotiations could be skipped if the two-year deadline is 
to be kept. However, the WTO-model would mean a significant deterioration of 
competitiveness for certain important British export sectors facing the EU’s ex-
ternal MFN tariffs. More than 35% of British goods exports to the EU belong to 
such high MFN-tariff commodity groups such as chemicals, cars, clothing, food, 
beverages, and tobacco (Booth et al. 2015: 17).
Exponents of this model therefore raise the possibility of a strong restructuring 
of the UK’s trade relations towards its important external partners, principally the 
US and the Commonwealth.
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There has been a certain re-orientation of British goods trade from European 
to overseas markets in recent years.8 This change of focus, however,  was ac-
companied by a deep structural shift in all British exports, with a growing role 
of services exports to the detriment of goods exports. It is telling that British 
goods trade with the EU bore a more than USD 100 billion deficit, while British 
trade in services with the EU yielded a surplus of about USD 80 billion in 2012 
(McFadden – Tarrant 2015: 23). 
According to a traditional approach, most services are for domestic consump-
tion only (so-called “sheltered” industries), but the UK is strongly competitive 
in just those services which, as opposed to “classical” services (e.g. hotels, res-
taurants/catering, healthcare, local transportation, gardening, housekeeping, hair-
dressing, and many others) are internationally traded. These include financial 
services, legal services, telecommunications, exports of technology, consulting, 
international air and sea transport, and business services. 
This structural shift is taking place, in a great number of cases, within firms and 
not, as often described in the international trade literature, between industries9. 
Many manufacturing firms based in the world’s leading industrial countries are 
growing from goods exporters into service exporters. For example, jet engine 
manufacturers (GE, Pratt & Whitney, or Rolls-Royce) increasingly compete with 
complex aerospace solutions instead of selling only engines. Some pharmaceu-
tical firms sell packages of therapies instead of drugs, and many construction 
companies export real estate development related services with building as only 
part of the project.
A new British export or trade policy strategy based on such a double shift 
(from goods to services and from Europe to overseas) would be very challenging 
for the economics profession. Some think-tanks have made more or less explicit 
references to the feasibility of such a strategy (Hulsman 2015; Buckle – Hewish 
2015; Irwin 2015), but it is not in sight yet. 
One of the reasons for this hiatus could be that the Brexit camp as such still 
lacks any common strategic ground due to the “low level of professionalism of 
pro-Brexit arguments” (Emerson 2016a), and this criticism applies especially to 
trade policy. The second, probably more relevant reason seems to be that the 
UK was the champion of TTIP within the EU (Irwin 2015: 23), but the TTIP 
project may fail regardless of Brexit. The elaboration of the UK’s own over-
 8  The relative share of the EU within the UK’s foreign trade decreased from 55 to 45% between 
2002 and 2012 (Mansfield 2015: 9). Currently, only Malta has a lower share of the EU in its 
foreign trade among the EU-28.
9  Cf. the problem of inter- vs. intra-industry trade (Krugman et al. 2015).
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seas trade strategy (targeting primarily the US and the Commonwealth) replac-
ing TTIP would need both strong domestic political support and ample time.
The Cat is back. Our survey of the post-Brexit trade policy options of the 
UK has revealed that the second step after exiting the EU’s trading system (the 
Common Market in old parlance) is not only far from obvious, but also quite un-
promising to the UK in any direction. The lid will be closed when Her Majesty’s 
Government launches the process of Brexit. At least in the trade policy sense, it is 
highly questionable whether it could be opened within two years from the Brexit 
announcement to Brussels.
3. HOW TO CONTINUE WITH BREXIT?
Our survey of some Brexit-related political issues could support those arguments 
that express doubts on the predictability of the real likelihood of Brexit, and the 
feasibility of its main scenarios outlined so far. Open questions range from the 
degree of legitimacy of British political decisions initiating the process, through 
the optimal mix of pro- and anti-co-operation patterns of sectoral regulations of 
EU–UK relationships, to the level of the acceptance of any possible final deal by 
British political, economic, and social interest groups. 
If this deal will be concluded at all. It could be potentially recognised by a fu-
ture political leader of the UK that finalising a definitive post-Brexit set of rules 
governing EU–UK relationships could create much more political tension in the 
country than maintaining a “yes to Brexit, but no to its realisation” kind of vague 
situation for a while. 
Such a situation might accompany the entire negotiation process. Even 
judgements on the process as such, regardless its content, could be conflict-
ing ones since the understanding of Brexit shows a wide variety of diverging 
views. Some people speak of it in past, others in present, and others again in 
future tense. This confusion of the time dimensions might support our analogy 
between Brexit and Schrödinger’s cat. Namely, that Brexit may find itself cur-
rently in the “third state”.
As a member of the European Union, the United Kingdom has been belonging 
to a system of economic and, to a certain extent, legal integration in which it had 
to bear significant costs and enjoyed certain important benefits. The pro-Brexit 
camp (or, to be more accurate, pressure group) feigned that it was familiar with the 
details of the gains/losses balance of European integration for the UK, and it de-
clared that this balance was unfavourable for the country. However (from February 
2016), “the ‛Leave’ campaign has so far been unable to come up with a credible 
and easily understandable “Brexit’ scenario” (Weiss – Blockmans 2016: 14).
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The much less aggressive and less loud anti-Brexit camp did not, as a matter of 
fact, say that this balance was beneficial for the UK. Some of its members rather 
pointed to measurement and comparison problems owing to which the balance 
could not be stricken. 
They preferred to make reserved statements on gains and losses along the line 
of “There are further effects on immigration, foreign investment and regulations. 
Although harder to quantify, Brexit is also likely, on balance, to depress income 
through these channels” (Ottaviano et al. 2014: 1). 
Similarly, “the balance of competence for the free movement of goods and 
intellectual property rights was in the UK’s interest” (Emerson 2016: 51). Or 
“Brexit would not only be bad for the UK, but would also be on balance bad for 
the EU. Both parties could waste years negotiating a new relationship. At a time 
when the post-World War II international order is under strain and Europe’s soci-
eties are increasingly threatened by protectionism, it is abundantly clear that the 
EU needs more than ever to be able to resolutely face the big global challenges” 
(Blockmans – Emerson 2016: 17).
Literature available in English on Brexit seems to yield a further thought-pro-
voking result. This result is completely in line with sources cited above point-
ing out the quite limited intellectual and research background of the pro-Brexit 
camp. We have gone through 31, mostly scholarly, but not necessarily theoretical 
publications on the Brexit issue, all of them from the time period 2014–2016. 
Of these, 26 can be considered to convey a straightforward anti-Brexit position. 
A further 5 studies represent reserved, more or less neutral or agnostic stand-
points on Brexit, with one or two among these noticing the possibility of certain 
Brexit-related gains for the UK in some narrower sectors. This is all. None of the 
materials surveyed expresses any kind of pro-Brexit opinion regarding any major 
field of European integration.
This is a stalemate-like situation in which important parts of the British and 
international economics research community have tried to outline and prove the 
dangers related to and the deficiencies of the Brexit process. The majority of the 
British electorate disregarded these warnings or was simply unaware of them. 
Mass psychology overwhelmed scholarly thinking. 
The euphoria of the winners in the first few post-Brexit days (and also part of 
the Brexit camp) seems to have evaporated. A limited part of the British politi-
cal elite remained on the deserted battlefield with the mission to accomplish the 
perhaps only past majority wish of the people. They are fully aware of the major 
pitfalls of their undertaking, while the anti-Brexit camp is well and alive in the 
UK. Stopping the process is not a real choice in a deeply democratic society, 
bringing it to its conclusion would involve sizeable economic risks. 
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The strategic options of the two main institutional players in this game seem 
to be far from being equivalent. The EU is, at least at the moment, reduced to 
passivity: it has to await the first step, the British government’s declaration on ini-
tiating the two-year-long exit process. But the legal and economic risks outlined 
above are a serious constraint on a really active attitude on the UK side. It has to 
find an effective blend of activity and passivity, capitalising on its first-mover-
advantage.
A quite feasible option of the British government might be the Cat strategy: 
stretching the Brexit process for as long as possible and gaining an EU-wide 
consensus to continue it after two years. This option would also include frequent 
statements expressing British insistence on Brexit, but seeking to maintain the 
“third state”. That is, trying to emulate such an imaginary airplane, which has 
performed a normal takeoff, but would prefer never to land. Neither alive nor 
dead, like the Cat.
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